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The Return of a Judicial Artifact?
How the Supreme Court Could Examine the Question of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Place in
Future Cases
Dalton Davis
Liberty University
I. Abstract
Before 1930, the nondelegation doctrine was a crucial interpretive tool used by the federal
courts to maintain the separation of powers between the legislative branch and the executive branch
of the United States Government. The Supreme Court stopped using the nondelegation doctrine in
the 1940s and the nondelegation doctrine has remained largely extinct at the federal level since
that time. However, recent decisions by the Supreme Court in Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
2116 (2019), Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), and Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter &
Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020), demonstrate that the Court appears to be open
to reconsidering the nondelegation doctrine’s place within mainstream judicial thought. This
article will examine the Supreme Court’s historical treatment of the nondelegation doctrine and
the current justices’ statements on the doctrine to analyze the likelihood of the return of the
nondelegation doctrine and potential implications of the doctrine’s return, in light of the questions
presented by recent cases.
Article I Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides, “All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.”1 For the first one hundred and fifty years after the Constitution’s
adoption, this clause was interpreted to serve two functions: 1) to grant Congress exclusive
legislative power and 2) to prevent legislative power from being employed by other federal
government branches.2 Yet, the Supreme Court slowly abandoned this interpretation of the
Constitution, known as the nondelegation doctrine, in the 1940s in favor of judicial deference to
1

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
The Constitution both provides each branch with specific enumerated powers and imposes affirmative limitations
that prevent one branch from taking another branch’s powers. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning,
88 VA. L. REV. 327, 336-43 (2002).
2
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federal agencies. Since the shift to deference, many in mainstream modern jurisprudence have
rejected the nondelegation doctrine as a legitimate legal principle3 and the nondelegation doctrine
generally remains dormant to the present day. However, recent cases like Gundy v. United States4
and Kisor v. Wilkie5 illustrate that the Court could turn away from judicial deference and return to
a form of the nondelegation doctrine. If the nondelegation doctrine returns, the doctrine could once
again prevent Congress from delegating its rulemaking powers to federal agencies. Under a
nondelegation framework, federal agencies could be prohibited from creating the functional
equivalent of new law by reinterpreting established statutes and writing new regulations without
direct congressional approval.
II. The Historical Treatment of the Nondelegation Doctrine
To see how the nondelegation doctrine could return, an examination of past cases involving
delegated rulemaking authority should be considered. The nondelegation doctrine has drastically
shrunk from its earliest applications to a rarely applied standard, permitting the delegation of
legislative authority to federal agencies when a statute is written ambiguously. Before the early
twentieth century, the federal judiciary employed the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate statutes
“only when the legislature had ceded power that threatened to undermine the system of checks and
balances.”6 In 1825, Chief Justice John Marshall articulated an early standard of the nondelegation
doctrine, stating that Congress cannot delegate to other parts of the federal government “powers
which are exclusively legislative.”7 The Court continued to routinely rely on this standard when a
delegation of authority was egregious.8 In particular, the Court applied the nondelegation doctrine
when an agency enforcement of a law had the effect of reinterpreting legislation.9 The Court’s
repeated application of the nondelegation doctrine established a clear boundary between Congress’
authority to draft the law and the executive’s power to enforce the law.
As the federal administrative state began to increase in size and influence during the late
1930s and early 1940s, one of the Court’s last applications of the nondelegation doctrine occurred
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.10 The controversy in Schechter arose after
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364 (2001) (“It is, after all, a
commonplace that the nondelegation doctrine is no doctrine at all.”); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2002) (“In our view there just is no
constitutional nondelegation rule, nor has there ever been.”). Scholars continue to debate the nondelegation
doctrine’s existence. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death
Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003) (responding to Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine);
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003) (rebutting
Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated).
4
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
5
139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
6
Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619,
621 (2017).
7
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42 (1825) (holding that the federal court’s actions conformed with the
nondelegation doctrine since Congress could delegate oversight of court proceedings to the judiciary).
8
See Iuliano & Whittington, supra note 6, at 621; see also United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. 141, 161-63 (1841)
(holding that the Treasury Department deviated from an act’s correct interpretation).
9
See Iuliano & Whittington, supra note 6, at 641; see also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)
(“That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to
the integrity and maintenance of the system of governance ordained by the Constitution.”).
10
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
3
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A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation was convicted for violating the National Industrial
Recovery Act.11 The National Industrial Recovery Act empowered the President to “impose such
conditions” and “exemptions” that “[the President] deem[ed] necessary to effectuate the policy
herein declared.”12 Based on the unrestricted grant of rulemaking authority, the Court struck down
the law because “Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to . . . make whatever
laws he thinks may be needed or advisable.”13 By requiring that Congress be the originator of laws,
the Court reaffirmed the separation of powers: Congress authors the laws, the executive enforces
the laws, and the judiciary determines when the wall of separation between the branches has been
breached.
After Schechter, the Court pivoted from its standard application of the nondelegation
doctrine to a steady reliance on judicial deference. When an agency action is challenged, judicial
deference generally guides the Court to defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute rather
than requiring the agency to enforce the Court’s best interpretation of the ambiguous statute.14 In
the 1940s, the Court began regularly deferring to administrative regulations so that agencies would
have flexibility to employ their expertise to acts of Congress.15 Over the next four decades, the
Court, under the deference framework, continued to allow administrative agencies to interpret
Congressional legislation in a broader sense than the nondelegation doctrine had allowed.
Illustrative of this approach is the Court’s ruling in Morton v. Ruiz,16 where the Court held that,
“[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”17 This pragmatic “gap” approach to deference is emblematic
of the Supreme Court’s shift from the nondelegation doctrine to judicial deference in its
consideration of agencies’ execution of federal law.
Following Morton, the contours of deference were not fully delineated until the Court’s
landmark ruling in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.18 In Chevron,
the Court more clearly outlined the breadth of judicial deference given to federal agencies. The
Court held that if Congressional intent is clear, then the statute is to be enforced according to its
unambiguous meaning.19 The Court further held that if the statute does not have a clearly
identifiable meaning, then “the question . . . is whether the agency's answer is based on a

11

Id. at 519.
Id. at 523.
13
Id. at 537.
14
See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (“[T]he ultimate criterion is the
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous.”).
15
Id.; see also Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941) (holding that when a delegation “to an administrative
body” occurs, that delegation “will be respected” and “left untouched.”); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381 (1940) (preserving the delegation since there was sufficient criteria provided to the agency).
16
415 U.S. 199 (1974).
17
Id. at 231.
18
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
19
Id. at 842. The judicial process of determining if a statute clearly speaks to a policy implementation or if the
statute is ambiguous is commonly referred to as step one of the Chevron analysis. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005) (applying the Chevron analysis). If the statute is clear,
then the clear meaning is controlling. Id. If the statute is ambiguous, then the courts apply step two of the Chevron
analysis. Id.
12
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permissible construction of the statute.”20 Essentially, Chevron established that whenever an
agency crafts a regulation based on an ambiguous statute, as long as the regulation is reasonably
drawn from the statute, then the agency’s regulatory action is consistent with the separation of
powers. In effect, unlike the nondelegation doctrine, Chevron deference provides a limited
pathway for Congress to shift part of its rulemaking authority to agencies through ambiguous
legislation.
After the establishment of Chevron deference, the Court heavily reduced the frequency of
its use of traditional statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of law and instead gave
significant latitude to the legislative and executive branches in the construction and enforcement
of statutes.21 This application of deference encouraged Congress to create ambiguous statutes filled
with vague language.22 With the Court stepping back from a direct approach to statutory
interpretation, the federal agencies applied these vague statutes, which consequently increased the
agencies’ influence and the size of the administrative state.23 This broad allowance for deference
continued to exist in a largely unchanged form until the early 2000s.24 However, limits on Chevron
deference recently began to appear in the cases of King v. Burwell25 and Michigan v. EPA.26
In King, the Court began to restrict the application of deference by reexamining what makes
a statute’s text ambiguous.27 King required, “the words of a statute must be read in their context”
to examine if the interpretation is reasonable.28 Once statutory analysis is completed, as the Court
in EPA clarified, “agencies must operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.”29 In
applying the “reasonable interpretation” standard, the Court found that the EPA had “strayed far
beyond” the limits of deference.30 Through King and EPA, the Court clarified the limits of judicial
deference’s ambiguity standard and restricted the applicability of deference. Ultimately, the

20

467 U.S. at 843. Step two of the Chevron analysis requires that an agency regulation be reasonable based on the
ambiguous statute’s construction and purpose. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 986.
21
See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 124 (1985) (applying deference since the statute
lacked an unambiguous standard); see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-33
(1985) (upholding that the regulations drawn from the Clean Water Act because the regulations were reasonable
interpretations of the statute); FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 439 (1986) (holding that deference should
be afforded since the interpretation conformed with the congressional purpose).
22
Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2015).
23
See Iuliano & Whittington, supra note 6, at 641. As of 2019, executive agencies had left approximately “175,000
pages” of federal regulations along with potentially “millions of pages of . . . ‘sub-regulatory’ policy . . . floating
around” based on Chevron’s deference framework. NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 84 (2019)
(internal parenthesis omitted).
24
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (explaining what agency actions merit Chevron deference).
Also, during this period, the nondelegation doctrine continued to remain dormant. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464-71 (2001) (declining to invalidate EPA’s regulatory scheme under the nondelegation
doctrine since the EPA followed an “intelligible principle”).
25
576 U.S. 473 (2015).
26
576 U.S. 743 (2015).
27
King reconsidered whether “a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency
to fill in the statutory gaps.” King, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
28
King, 576 U.S. at 497.
29
EPA, 576 U.S. at 751.
30
Id.
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historical record indicates that the nondelegation doctrine has remained in judicial hibernation
since the 1930’s and has been effectively replaced by the Court’s modern deference framework.
III. An Analysis of the Justice’s Prior Opinions Regarding the Nondelegation Doctrine
Following King and EPA, the Supreme Court reconsidered judicial deference and the
nondelegation doctrine most recently in the case of Gundy v. United States.31 In Gundy, the Court
considered the constitutionality of the legislative authority delegated to the executive branch under
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).32 Under SORNA, the Attorney
General determined which criminal penalties would apply to certain groups of sex offenders. 33
After the Attorney General set the penal requirements, improperly registered or unregistered sex
offenders could be prosecuted.34 Unlike previous cases, two factors make Gundy significant and
indicate that the Court could begin reshaping its nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence.
The first significant factor in Gundy is that a majority of the Supreme Court was unable to
reach a consensus on the nondelegation doctrine. At the time Gundy was heard, Justice Brett
Kavanaugh had not been confirmed to the Court to replace Justice Anthony Kennedy.35 With only
eight sitting members, the Court failed to reach a five-member majority opinion in Gundy.36
Instead, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined Justice Elena
Kagan’s plurality opinion that preserved Chevron deference by upholding the Attorney General’s
interpretation and implementation of the statute.37 Justice Samuel Alito, writing a separate
concurrence, agreed with Justice Kagan’s opinion in judgment, but differed significantly in
reasoning.38 Separately, Justice Neil Gorsuch dissented, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justice Clarence Thomas.39 In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch argued for the Court to realign its
jurisprudence with the Court’s historic treatment of the nondelegation doctrine and to find that the
statute improperly delegated power.40 Thus, Gundy resulted in a stalemate on the High Court.
The second factor in Gundy that indicates a possible reconsideration of the nondelegation
doctrine is the indication in Justice Alito’s concurrence that the Court could reexamine the
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). The Court certified the following question: “[w]hether the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act’s delegation to the Attorney General in 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d))
violates the constitutional nondelegation doctrine.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Gundy v. United States, 139
S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (No. 17-6086).
32
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121-22 (2019).
33
Id. at 2122.
34
Id.
35
Gundy was argued on October 2, 2018. See Mila Sohoni, Argument Analysis: Justices Grapple with
Nondelegation Challenge, SCOTUSBLOG, (Oct. 3, 2018, 1:33 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/argumentanalysis-justices-grapple-with-nondelegation-challenge/. Justice Kavanaugh was sworn in on October 6, 2018. See
Kristina Peterson & Natalie Andrews, Senate Votes to Confirm Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court, WALL ST.STREET.
J., (October 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-poised-to-confirm-kavanaugh-for-supreme-court1538834976
36
139 S. Ct. at 2120.
37
Id. at 2121.
38
Id. at 2130-31 (Alito, J. concurring).
39
Id. at 2131.
40
Id. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting) (stating that “[i]f the separation of powers means anything, it must mean that
Congress cannot give the executive branch a blank check to write a code of conduct governing private conduct for a
half-million people.”).
31
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nondelegation doctrine in the near future. In the opinion, Justice Alito highlighted his openness to
the nondelegation doctrine. “If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we
have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”41 However, Justice Alito refrained
from joining Justice Gorsuch’s dissent doctrine since “a majority” of the Court was “not willing
to [reconsider the nondelegation doctrine].”42 Thus, Justice Alito concurred in judgement since “it
would be freakish to single out the [SORNA] for special treatment.”43 Though not a direct
endorsement of the nondelegation doctrine, by demonstrating his willingness to reexamine the
Court’s current treatment of the nondelegation doctrine, Justice Alito summarized a position taken
by half of the Court in Gundy: once a fifth member of the Court is open to reconsidering the
nondelegation doctrine, then the nondelegation doctrine could be reestablished.
The recent change in the Court’s composition after Gundy further indicates that the Court
could revitalize the nondelegation doctrine. Since Gundy, Justice Kavanagh and Justice Amy
Coney Barrett have been confirmed to replace Justice Kennedy and the late Justice Ginsburg,
respectively. The confirmations of Justice Kavanagh and Justice Barrett are significant because
either Justice could provide the tie-breaking vote necessary to form a majority opinion regarding
the nondelegation doctrine. Both Justice Kavanaugh’s views and Justice Barrett’s views on the
nondelegation doctrine and judicial deference are addressed below.
Justice Kavanaugh’s views on the nondelegation doctrine indicate an openness to a form
of the doctrine returning to prominence. While on the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Kavanaugh wrote
a dissenting opinion on a denial for an en banc hearing in United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC.44
The controversy in Telecom Ass’n stemmed from a 2015 regulatory reclassification granted by the
FCC that gave the FCC additional authority to regulate internet providers.45 In essence, Telecom
Ass’n centered on whether the statute was genuinely ambiguous and thus would allow the FCC to
institute a new “net neutrality rule” on internet providers.
In Telecom Ass’n, although the D.C. Circuit denied an en banc hearing, Judge Kavanaugh’s
dissent indicated his view that the Constitution only grants legislative power to Congress. 46 In
addressing what standard should be applied to cases such as Telecom Ass’n, Judge Kavanaugh
differed from his colleagues’ allowance for broad amounts of deference to be granted to federal
agencies in their rulemaking activities.47 Specifically, Judge Kavanaugh stated, “If an agency
wants to exercise expansive regulatory authority over some major social or economic activity…an
ambiguous grant of statutory authority is not enough. Congress must clearly authorize an agency
to take such a major regulatory action.”48 Judge Kavanaugh further argued that a “long-extant
statute” like the Communications Act of 1934 should not be employed by agencies to justify new
41

Id. at 2131 (Alito, J. concurring).
Id.
43
Id.
44
855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
45
855 F.3d 381, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., dissenting).
46
Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 418 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“To protect liberty, the Constitution divides power
among the three branches of the National Government. The Constitution vests Congress with the legislative
power.”).
47
Id. at 419 (“The Executive Branch does not possess a general, free-standing authority to issue binding legal rules.
The executive may issue rules only pursuant to and consistent with a grant of authority directly from Congress.”).
48
Id. at 422.
42
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“major rules” that affect areas of “economic and political significance.”49 Rather, Judge
Kavanaugh articulated a two-part test to apply in such situations: 1) Whether the regulation is a
“major rule?” and 2) whether Congress “clearly authorized” the agency to issue the rule?50 Overall,
Justice Kavanaugh’s major rules test demonstrates his understanding of how deference to federal
agencies should be approached.
In addition to his D.C. Circuit Court opinions, Justice Kavanaugh has also expressed a
significant interest in the nondelegation doctrine while on the Supreme Court. In a statement
regarding the denial of certiorari in Paul v. United States,51 Justice Kavanaugh elaborated on his
view of the legal question that was presented in the case of Gundy.52 Writing about Paul, which,
like Gundy, addressed the SORNA,53 Justice Kavanaugh stated that nondelegation may “warrant
further consideration.”54 Justice Kavanaugh went on to say that Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy
and restrictions on congressional delegations of legislative authority could be reexamined by the
Court.55 Justice Kavanaugh’s comments on the denial of certiorari demonstrate his consistent
interest in a reconsideration of the nondelegation doctrine. Based on his statements on both the
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, Justice Kavanaugh has indicated a willingness to reconsider
the return of the nondelegation doctrine in a modern context.
Like Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett also addressed the nondelegation doctrine prior to
her time on the Court and appears open to the nondelegation doctrine. Although Justice Barrett has
not yet heard a case at the Supreme Court directly dealing with the nondelegation doctrine, she
briefly addressed the doctrine in an article written during her time as a law professor.56
Specifically, then-Professor Barrett examined the delegation of congressional authority granted to
the president to suspend habeas corpus in a national emergency.57 Professor Barrett, summarizing
the constitutional underpinnings of the “‘suspension by delegation’ model” that controls
suspension of habeas corpus, stated that “the modern nondelegation doctrine imposes few limits
upon Congress’s ability to shift policymaking discretion to the Executive.”58 While the limits on
delegations are few, Professor Barrett also recognized that when disputes over the amount of
delegation between the branches occur, defining the limits “between the branches is a traditional
judicial task.”59 Professor Barrett’s understanding of the nondelegation doctrine holds that judicial
deference is not absolute. Rather, Professor Barrett argued that the nondelegation doctrine, while
limited in its application, is still an applicable judicial doctrine in the modern era.60
After defining the nondelegation doctrine’s general limits, then-Professor Barrett went on
to note that the nondelegation doctrine can more definitely restrict executive action when a
49

Id. at 423-24.
Id.
51
140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
52
Id.
53
United States v. Paul, 718 Fed. Appx. 360 (6th Cir., 2017).
54
140 S. Ct. 342 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
55
Id.
56
Amy Coney Barrett, Suspension and Delegation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 251 (2014).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 265
59
Id.
60
See Id. at 321 (“Despite its leniency, the nondelegation doctrine does not maintain that Congress can change the
constitutional allocation of power by shifting the sum of its power in a particular area to the Executive.”).
50
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citizen’s “fundamental rights” are implicated.61 Professor Barrett argued that “[t]he Constitution’s
wariness of executive power,” and “the relatively exacting approach taken to statutes affecting
fundamental rights, support a more demanding application of the nondelegation doctrine.”62
Professor Barrett also argued that different weights could be assigned to the nondelegation doctrine
based on the kind of rights implicated in each case.63 To make her point, Professor Barrett cited
the Supreme Court’s own reluctance to answer “whether ‘something more than an ‘intelligible
principle’ is required when Congress authorizes another Branch to promulgate regulations that
contemplate criminal sanctions’ because ‘regulations of this sort pose a heightened risk to
individual liberty.’”64 Overall, Justice Barrett considers the nondelegation doctrine as an available
tool of statutory interpretation that can be applied in limited contexts, even under the Court’s
current Chevron deference framework.65
When each of the nine Justices’ positions on the nondelegation doctrine’s recent treatment
is considered, the Court appears open to reconsidering the nondelegation doctrine. Currently, four
of the nine Justices have either written or joined an opinion calling for the nondelegation doctrine
to either be reconsidered in the future66 or reinstituted to limit agency rulemaking authority over
criminal penalties.67 Additionally, Justice Barrett prior to joining the Supreme Court68 and Justice
Kavanaugh during his time on both the D.C. Circuit69 and while on the Supreme Court70 have also
stated that the Court could apply a form of the nondelegation doctrine. Based upon these
statements, six Justices have indicated that they are open to considering a future case with a claim
arising under the nondelegation doctrine, two more Justices than necessary to grant certiorari under
the traditional Rule of Four.71 With the current Court’s composition in view, an analysis of the
Court’s recent precedent related to the nondelegation doctrine should also be considered in
assessing the future of the nondelegation doctrine.
IV. The Future of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Light of Recent Rulings
61

Id. at 319.
Id.
63
Id. at 319 n.286 (“If the scale can slide down in areas in which the Constitution renders the Executive particularly
powerful, it might slide up in areas in which the Constitution’s allocation of authority reflects particular wariness of
executive power.”).
64
Id. at 319 n.286 (citing Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991)). In Touby, the Court held that “we need not
resolve” if more than an intelligible principle is required when individual liberty is implicated “today.” 500 U.S.
160, 166 (1991).
65
During her time on the Seventh Circuit, then-Judge Barrett reviewed agency action in light of a Chevron
deference framework consistent with Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent. See Cook Cty. v. Wolf, 962
F.3d 208, 234 (7th Cir., 2020) (J., Barrett, dissenting). Of note, a May 15, 2021, search on LexisNexis for cases
involving “Amy Coney Barrett” and “nondelegation,” produced zero results.
66
See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130-31 (Alito, J. concurring).
67
Id. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting).
68
See Barrett, supra note 56.
69
Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
70
Paul, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
71
See Ira P. Robbins, Justice by the Numbers: The Supreme Court and the Rule of Four – Or Is It Five, 36 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2002) (discussing the Court’s use of the Rule of Four that requires four Justices to vote in favor
of hearing a case on the merits to grant a cert petition). See Justin Walker, The Kavanaugh Court and the Schechterto-Chevron Spectrum: How the New Supreme Court Will Make the Administrative State More Democratically
Accountable, 95 IND. L.J. 923 (2020) for additional insight into the likelihood of the Court reconsidering the
nondelegation doctrine.
62
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Recently, the Supreme Court has decided administrative agency cases largely by relying
on traditional principles of statutory interpretation rather than deferring to agencies under
Chevron.72 An example of the Court’s application of statutory interpretation principles to
determine the correct meaning of a statute rather than applying Chevron deference can be observed
in the case of County of Maui v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund.73 The point of contention in County of
Maui centered around whether water treatment facilities should fall under the Clean Water Act’s
regulations as a “direct discharge” to navigable waters or whether the facilities’ pollutants should
only fall under state and local regulations.74
Although County of Maui appeared to present the Court with a case ripe for the
reconsideration of Chevron deference, the Court did not address the underlying separation of
powers issue created by the current framework for legislative and executive rulemaking authority
in the application of statutes. Instead, throughout briefing and oral argument, the issue of what the
statute meant by a direct conveyance garnered the majority of the Court’s attention.75 In the
majority opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and
adopted a “middle ground” approach to the interpretation of the Clean Water Act that relied upon
the Court’s traditional statutory interpretation principles.76 Essentially, the Court held that the
agencies application of the statute was permissible since the congressional intent to reduce
pollution that would ultimately flow into navigable waters would be achieved.77 Specifically, the
Court held that it would be permissible for the EPA to regulate the “functional equivalent of a
direct discharge” because the statute required the EPA to regulate direct discharges.78 Overall,
County of Maui reaffirmed the Court’s use of statutory interpretation principles and avoided the
application of judicial deference principles.79 However, County of Maui left open the question of
whether deference should be followed by the Court in the future or whether a stricter type of
statutory interpretation could become the controlling standard.
While the Court did not address the future of deference in County of Maui, the Court
appeared open to placing limitations on deference doctrines in Kisor v. Wilkie80 and Little Sisters

72

The Court last clearly deferred to an agency under Chevron in 2016 in Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.
Ct. 2131 (2016) (ruling that Congress left an ambiguous gap that allowed the agency to issue reasonable rules under
Chevron). Since then, the Court has declined to defer to agencies under Chevron in cases like Smith v. Berryhill,
139 S. Ct. 1765 (2019) (holding that there was no disagreement between the government and Smith that the statute
was unambiguous), Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (holding that the plain meaning of the
statute was unambiguous making Chevon inapplicable) and Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138, S. Ct. 767 (2018)
(ruling that Congress had clearly spoken on the issue foreclosing the option of Chevron deference).
73
140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
74
Cnty. of Maui v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1470 (2020).
75
See Brief for Petitioner County of Maui v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260), Brief for
Respondent County of Maui v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260), Transcript of Oral Argument
at 75, County of Maui v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (No. 18-260).
76
140 S. Ct. at 1468.
77
Id. at 1476.
78
Id.
79
The Court noted that Chevron deference was not applied in this case because “to follow EPA’s reading would
open a loophole allowing easy evasion of the statutory provision’s basic purposes. Such an interpretation is
neither persuasive nor reasonable.” Id. at 1474.
80
139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
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of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania.81 In Kisor, the Court addressed the doctrine
of Auer deference by considering the Department of Veterans Affairs’ reinterpretation of existing
executive regulations.82 Justice Kagan, writing for the majority in Kisor, placed expanded guidance
for and restrictions on deference’s application to the Executive branch’s reinterpretation of
regulations.83 The Court held deference can only apply “if a regulation is genuinely ambiguous”
and is not just a more preferable interpretation for the agency’s policy interest.84 Further, the Court
held that deference does not regularly permit new administrative interpretations of regulations.85
Simply, the Court’s ruling in Kisor has “cabined” the extent of deference’s reach so that is tamed
but holds enough force to be useful when necessary.86
Adding to the majority’s view that deference needed to be restrained, Justice Gorsuch’s
concurrence indicates that the Court’s opinion in Kisor not only limited deference but made
deference unusable.87 Based upon the extensive limitations, Justice Gorsuch stated that there
would be little difference between keeping deference on “life support” in its “zombiefied” state,
as the majority outlined, and overturning the doctrine entirely.88 Effectively, Kisor indicated that
although deference has not been entirely overturned, the doctrine has been significantly confined
to a much more limited role in administrative law as the Court has placed greater weight on the
separation of powers between Congress and executive agencies.
As the Court has limited the scope of deference in recent years, the question of whether
deference should be replaced by the pre-1940 nondelegation doctrine or another modern form of
the nondelegation doctrine still remains unanswered. For example, in Little Sisters of the Poor, the
Court examined the issue of an agency’s authority to grant exceptions to agency regulations in the
context of an exception to the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate.89 While the Court did
find that the agency’s exception to the statute was valid, the Court was explicit that a nondelegation
claim had not been raised on appeal.90 The Court made clear: “No party has pressed a constitutional
challenge to the breadth of the delegation involved here. Cf. Gundy v. United States, 588 U. S.
___, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 204 L. Ed. 2d 522 (2019). The only question we face today is what the plain
language of the statute authorizes.”91 By citing to Gundy, the Court appeared to acknowledge that
the issue of the nondelegation doctrine's future is unresolved and that the Court is open to hearing
arguments about the application of the nondelegation in a future case. While Kisor and Little
81

140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019). Although related to Chevron deference that is applied when Congress delegates
regulatory authority to executive agencies, Auer deference is distinct because it is applied to the interpretation and
reinterpretation of already established agency regulations. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)
(upholding the agency interpretation as a permissible “creature of the Secretary's own regulations” since “his
interpretation of [the regulation] is, under our jurisprudence, controlling.”). However, since Chevron deference and
Auer deference are similar in their constitutional foundations, the Court’s opinion in Kisor indicates a continued
interest in potentially partially abandoning deference.
83
139 S. Ct. at 2410-18.
84
Id. at 2415.
85
Id. at 2418.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 2425 (J., Gorsuch, concurring).
88
Id.
89
140 S. Ct. at 2372-73.
90
Id. at 2382.
91
Id.
82
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Sisters of the Poor are clear that nondelegation has not yet returned to its pre-1940 position, these
cases indicate that the Court is prepared to address the underlying conflict between judicial
deference and the nondelegation doctrine in a future decision. Such a future decision could lead to
an even greater reduction in the Court’s acceptance of Congressional delegation of rulemaking
authority. In sum, the Court’s recent cases have established that the nondelegation doctrine may
not remain a judicial artifact in perpetuity but that it could return to more frequent use in the near
future.
V. Potential Implications of a Revitalization of the Nondelegation Doctrine
If the Supreme Court revives the nondelegation doctrine, the revived doctrine will have a
seismic impact on the federal government’s regulatory scheme. Although the Court has not
indicated which, if any version of the nondelegation doctrine it would apply, if the Court voted to
resurrect the pre-1940 nondelegation doctrine or adopt a modern standard like the “major rules''
version of the nondelegation doctrine that Justice Kavanaugh has suggested, there would be
significant ramifications for future Congressional legislation and the administrative state’s ability
to engage in agency rulemaking.92 Such a ruling by the Supreme Court could allow regulations to
be overturned as improperly exceeding the authority of federal agencies.93 This type of limitation
on agency authority could require Congress to write more specific laws to address major political
or economic issues. Additionally, this potential return of the nondelegation doctrine would
reestablish the Judicial branch as the branch of government with primary authority over the
interpretation of law. Overall, by reinstating the nondelegation doctrine, the Supreme Court could
potentially force a partial restructuring of the way Congress currently writes laws and limit the
deference given to a federal agency’s interpretation of statutes or regulations.
In conclusion, although the nondelegation doctrine has been largely set aside by the Court
for almost eighty-five years, Gundy and other recent cases indicate that the ongoing debate over
the doctrine’s future in America’s administrative law system could result in the Court revitalizing
the nondelegation doctrine. In light of this debate, the Court has been presented with an
opportunity, with the confirmation of a tiebreaking fifth vote in either Justice Kavanaugh or Justice
Barrett, to address this important question in a future case: will the Court require strict statutory
92

Even though the Justice’s prior statements indicate their general views of the nondelegation doctrine, which
standard or test the Court would rely upon to apply the nondelegation doctrine remains unclear. For examples of
how the Court could potentially seek to apply the nondelegation doctrine see, Walker supra note 71 (outlining how
the Court could take measured steps to erode undemocratic legislative delegations based on the Court’s composition
following Justice Kavanaugh’s appointment to the Supreme Court); see also Ilan Wurman, As-Applied
Nondelegation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 975, 1017 (2018) (exploring the application of the nondelegation doctrine to
“narrower delegations” of legislative authority); Cody Ray Milner, Into the Multiverse: Replacing the Intelligible
Principle Standard with a Modern Multi-Theory of Nondelegation, 28 GEO. MASON L. REV. 395 (2020) (proposing a
tripart categorization of nondelegation claims depending on the breadth and nature of the delegation); Michael
Sebring, The Major Rules Doctrine: How Justice Brett Kavanaugh's Novel Doctrine Can Bridge the Gap between
the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 189 (2018) (analyzing the workability of the
major rules doctrine and the major rules doctrine’s transfer of policy making authority from politically
unaccountable federal officials to politically accountable elected officials).
93
For example, Justice Kagan, writing for the Court in Gundy, noted the widespread ramifications of a revitalized
nondelegation doctrine on the federal government. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (“Indeed, if SORNA’s
delegation is unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is on the need
to give discretion to executive officials to implement its programs.”).
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interpretation and reinstitute the nondelegation doctrine? If the nine current Justices maintain their
previously expressed views on deference doctrines and the nondelegation doctrine, then the
Supreme Court could soon hand down a majority ruling in favor of the nondelegation doctrine in
a future decision. If the Court issues such a decision, then the structure and influence of the
administrative state’s rulemaking authority would be fundamentally lessened. Overall, based on
the Court’s recent treatment of judicial deference and the nondelegation doctrine, further attention
should be given to the potential reemergence of the nondelegation doctrine due to the major
ramifications such a ruling would have upon Congress’s ability to delegate through statutes to
federal agencies.
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